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Beyond Brinkmanship: The Implication of South 
China Sea Conflicts on China’s Soft Power in 
Southeast Asia 
 
Randy W. Nandyatama  Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia 
Abstract 
While contemporary scholarly literatures on South China Sea conflicts have been 
dominated by hard power calculations, some other aspects remain under-researched. 
Rather underplayed in the existing literature is the question on the political implication 
of the conflicts on China’s soft power in the region. In responding to this issue, this 
article tries to carefully investigate the nature of the China’s soft power and the linkage 
between the increasing Chinese assertive measures in the South China Sea and the 
foundation of China’s soft power in the region. Through some cases of China’s skirmishes 
with Southeast Asian countries on the South China Sea between 2009 and 2012, this 
article argues that Beijing’s increasing hard power measures have induced growing 
threat perceptions in the region. This very context not only signals a distinct dissonance 
of Beijing’s image in Southeast Asia but also creates surging discontents and rejections 
to China’s role and political position in the region. Ultimately, China’s perceived 
inappropriate hard power measures affect its soft power, particularly in eroding the 
reputation of being a benign political entity as its source of soft power in Southeast Asia.  
Key words: China-Southeast Asia, soft power, threat perception 
 
Introduction 
The twenty first century has 
generally deemed to be an important era 
for China. Along with its remarkable 
transformation and modernization since 
1978, China’s political power in the 
international arena began to expand 
rapidly. The poor and weak China has 
become a center of attention in global 
politics (Brahm, 2001; Senkar, 2004). The 
modernization of its military posture and 
the fast growing of its economy have 
changed how other countries engage with 
Beijing. Its neighboring countries have 
started to build friendly interactions with 
the rising China, including Southeast 
Asian countries. Nevertheless, 
concomitant with its growing 
international profile, Beijing also started to 
have strong military measures, 
particularly in the South China Sea 
(Wong, 2010; Thayer, 2010, pp. 2-6; 
Jayakumar, 2011). Along with existing 
conflicts over territorial claims between 
China and some Southeast Asian 
countries, the growing China’s assertive 
measures eventually created a greater 
political concern in the region. 
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Indeed, there is a general tendency 
in privileging the preponderance of hard 
power calculations in the International 
Relations literatures (Baldwin, 1999, pp. 
173-183). This specifically exists in the 
scholarly literature on South China Sea 
conflicts (Green & Daniel, 2011; Karim & 
Tangguh, 2016) However, as the rise of 
China increasingly influences 
contemporary global politics, it becomes 
important to not only investigate China’s 
actual capability in terms of its traditional 
‘hard’ power in influencing Southeast 
Asia, but also assess its soft power and the 
implication of its ‘hard power’ measures 
on its soft power in the region. This is not 
without a clear logic. In an event which 
involves hard power measures, for 
instance, it is easy to prioritize hard 
power’s examination and overlook its soft 
power aspect, such as how the United 
States (US) calculate its hard power 
capability in ‘securing’ Iraq and 
Afghanistan. However, it is important to 
note that US hard power measures as part 
of global ‘war on terror’ campaign, in fact, 
weaken its ‘soft power’ in the Middle East 
(Nye, 2004, pp. 42-44). Reminiscing this 
context, a similar concern for China may 
arise, especially in light of the rising 
tension in the South China Sea conflicts. 
As such, it is important inquire what is the 
nature of China’s soft power in Southeast 
Asia? And how South China Sea conflicts 
affect its soft power in the region? 
Echoing Todd Hall’s (2010) effort 
in investigating soft power as a category 
of analysis, this article underlines the logic 
of how soft power, especially in the form 
of reputation, serves as an important 
reference for political interactions in the 
international arena. Within this context, 
the capability to project and sustain 
particular reputations ‘provide states with 
issue-specific forms of influence’ (Hall, 
2010, pp. 209). This logic is well apparent 
in China’s foreign policy, especially as a 
logical pathway for Beijing’s soft power in 
Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, since this 
article emphasizes good reputation as the 
source of soft power, its existence and 
foundation can be easily weakened by 
negative perceptions, such as excessive or 
inappropriate use of hard power. Hence, 
we can see that Beijing’s growing 
assertiveness, particularly the utilization 
of hard power measures in managing the 
South China Sea conflicts, has induced the 
burgeoning of ‘threat perceptions’ among 
Southeast Asian countries and eroded 
China’s reputation as its source of soft 
power.  
Specifically, in investigating the 
dynamic quality of Beijing’s soft power in 
Southeast Asia and the linkage between 
the growing ‘threat perception’ from 
China’s hard power measures and its soft 
power in in Southeast Asia, this article 
gathers qualitative data from the series of 
surveys on China’s popularity as well as 
elites’ opinions and statements on China 
(including Beijing’s increasing hard power 
measures in South China Sea). Indeed, 
given the complex relationship between 
China and Southeast Asia, including the 
different characteristics of mainland 
Southeast Asia and maritime Southeast 
Asia in dealing with China, it is 
impossible to claim that there is a solid 
and definitive Southeast Asian perception 
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of China (Percival, 2007; Storey, 2013). 
However, this does not mean that we 
cannot see a growing trend of how some 
Southeast Asian countries respond to 
Beijing’s growing assertive measures in 
the South China Sea. As a result, this 
article reviews the existence and quality of 
China’s soft power in two countries that 
represent different geo-political groupings 
in Southeast Asia, namely Vietnam and 
the Philippines. Despite this decision may 
also have a certain bias, this decision is 
based on the data availability. Existing 
survey data on popularity of China in 
Southeast Asia only covers particular 
countries like Vietnam and The 
Philippines. The gathered data also only 
covers the time span of 2000 to 2012. This 
is aimed to provide a better analysis on 
the impact of South China Sea conflict on 
China’s soft power. In 2013, Beijing 
formulated a new policy—i.e. One Belt 
and Road—which alters the political map 
of China-Southeast Asia relations. 
Ultimately, this article evaluates 
China’s approach in exercising its soft 
power projection in Southeast Asia and 
underlines how inappropriate hard power 
measures eventually entangle with soft 
power. Specifically, article is structured 
into four main parts in which each 
element is taken into account. Following 
this introduction, the next part covers on 
the conceptualization of soft power as the 
foundation of this research. The second 
part will focus the nature of China’s soft 
power in the Southeast Asia. The third 
part of this article broadly elaborate the 
case of the South China Sea conflicts, 
especially in assessing Southeast Asian 
responses. In the end, it will discuss the 
linkages of the South China Sea conflicts 
to the contemporary China’s soft power. 
Conceptualizing Soft Power 
The term ‘soft power’ is a unique 
notion. It becomes a distinct phrase as it 
refers to a large spectrum of non-military 
hard power in the international arena. It is 
also generally adopted in implying the 
various non-tangible modalities which 
support a particular state to persuade or 
influence the preferences of other states 
(Hall, 2010, pp. 190). This concept is 
rooted from E. H. Carr’s (1949) notion of 
‘power over opinion’ which acknowledges 
that public and elite opinion is one of the 
essential elements in the international 
arena and it forms a distinct political force 
from military or economic power. Steven 
Lukes (2005, pp. 25-29) advances further 
this idea into the so-called ‘the third 
dimension of power’—i.e. the ability to 
affect and shape the formation of 
perceptions and preferences in ensuring 
the acceptance of a particular role in the 
existing order, and vice versa. 
However, only after Joseph Nye 
writes about ‘power’ along with the 
growing interdependent and transnational 
issues and actors in international politics, 
‘soft power’ becomes a well-known 
concept in IR literatures. Nye (2005, p. x) 
specifically defines soft power as ‘a 
country’s ability to get what it wants through 
appeal and attraction.’ This concept 
underlines the logic of how various viable 
resources can be applied to make other 
countries acquire more positive beliefs 
and perceptions which eventually resulted 
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in the targeted states’ greater tendency to 
respect and give amicable response. Thus, 
Nye’s exposition of soft power becomes a 
ground-breaking analytical tool, especially 
for identification of the new trend in 
culture and positive image projection 
from a rising state in the world, such as 
China. 
At this juncture, it is important to 
note that Nye offers a relational approach 
as a new model in making sense the 
existence of soft power in international 
politics. Nye notes that soft power is not 
always fungible. In other words, the 
effectiveness of soft power depends on 
how each country utilizes its ‘ability to 
influence other’s behavior’. As such, a 
particular country does not have an 
inherent soft power; yet, it has to be 
generated from the process of attribution 
among the international actors. Any 
country will get the result it prefers 
because the other states realize the 
legitimacy of the respective state and 
follow its narrative (Huang & Sheng, 2006, 
pp. 23-34). Therefore, the study of soft 
power in this article is not focused on the 
quantity of soft power, but in the context 
of how the source of soft power turns into 
an active element in shaping other 
countries’ behavior. 
Nevertheless, sinologists have 
realized some difficulties in assessing 
China’s soft power (Yan, 2006, pp. 6). 
Despite major works on China’s soft 
power, such as Kurlantzick (2007) and 
Lampton (2008), researches often focus on 
identifying and predicting the impact of 
Beijing’s soft power and pay less attention 
to how does it actually operate. In this 
regard, looking at Hall’s (2010) logic of the 
various sources of soft power may offer an 
important analytical tool. For him, a set of 
issue-specific reputations will support a 
particular country on the respective issue, 
signifying the so-called ‘reputational power’ 
(Hall, 2010, pp. 209). Along with the 
conditions which are predominated by the 
inadequacy of Beijing’s contemporary 
leadership in the global arena and the 
characteristics of suspicion and mistrust 
between countries in Asia, the primary 
source of China’s soft power basically lies 
on its reputation. In the manner where 
every actor interprets each other, the 
image (mianzi) of Beijing reputation in the 
international arena is important for the 
decision-making process of other actors 
(Hall, 2010, pp. 207-211).  
Certainly, the examination of soft 
power needs to also acknowledge the 
intertwining mechanism between soft 
power and hard power. As Nye (2004, pp. 
25-30; Li, 2009, pp. 4-5) notes before, soft 
power needs to be welded in a tactical 
manner in the realm of intersubjectivity 
among international actors. As such, the 
research on soft power demands a further 
exposition in its structure of action and 
the surrounding influencing factors, 
including whether hard power measures 
exist. At this point, one cannot simplify 
the structure of hard power as the 
utilization of military force in destroying 
and paralyzing the enemy, but on a much 
broader aspect, especially in terms of its 
ability in imposing clear directive through 
its consequences for other countries and 
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generating a distinct perception among 
other entities. 
In the case of the complex relations 
between China and Southeast Asia, the 
analysis of soft power, thus, relies on 
other countries’ perception of Chinese 
reputation. It implies that hard power 
measures and the basis of soft power are 
interlinked, as both powers may share the 
same juncture, namely ‘threat perception’. 
By adopting the notion of threat 
perception, this research tries to elucidate 
the crucial conceptual bridge in 
understanding how China’s hard power 
measure affects its soft power and political 
images, particularly along with the 
repercussion of actual misconduct or ‘be 
perceived as misconduct’ measures (Li, 
2009, pp. 5). Moreover, it also indicates the 
subjective nature of international actors, 
especially the elite, as they perceive the 
growing external hard power measures 
(Tilman, 1984, pp. 2-3; Novotny, 2010, pp. 
67-68). 
The Nature of China’s Soft Power in 
Southeast Asia 
Along with the onset of the post-
Cold War era, Beijing’s foreign policy was 
gradually transformed with renewed 
vigor. There was a strong willingness to 
sustain its rapid economic development 
through being an active actor in the 
international arena. However, at the same 
time, China’s meteoric economic rise 
started becoming a global spotlight. Often 
being compared with and likened to the 
rise of Germany and Japan during the pre-
World War II, Western scholars regarded 
the rise of China as a new global concern, 
forming the so-called ‘China threat’ theory 
(Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 396-402; 
Krauthammer, 1995, pp. 72; Roy, 1996, pp. 
758-771). By mid 1990s, this narrative 
started to influence some major powers’ 
political behaviors against China. As a 
result, a growing ‘containment’ policy 
towards Beijing seemingly manifested in 
the international arena, such as the US-
Japan alliance in 1996 as a gesture in 
restraining Chinese ambitions (Nye, 2002, 
pp. 22), and US effort in persuading the 
European Union to retain its arms-
embargo on China (Archick, Grimmett, & 
Kan, 2005).  
Against the abovementioned 
backdrop, Beijing became fully aware that 
the growing anxiety over ‘China threat’ 
theory could negatively impact its 
prospect for development. Besides that, 
considering that the modern China was 
initially emerged as mere one of 
developing countries in the world, Beijing 
had a limited claim and legitimacy, 
especially in terms of its source of soft 
power (Wang, 2011, pp. 37-53). In this 
regard, China realized the need for 
overcoming the suspicion and mistrust 
from its regional environment and 
encountering the growing China threat 
theory with a careful projection of its soft 
power via promoting a better ‘reputation’ 
in the international arena (Deng, 2006, pp. 
186-206). In seemingly echoing Hall’s 
categorization of reputational power, 
Beijing underlines how building a certain 
new image and reputation as a ‘benign’ 
rising country will help inducing other 
states to respect and support China’s 
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agenda and position at the international 
arena. 
As a response, Chinese 
government and scholars have rapidly 
began to endorse a new consideration in 
improving national image, especially 
through the domestic debate on how 
China should encounter ‘China threat’ 
theory and pursue its national goal. Zheng 
Bijiang, for instance, notably points out 
the conception of ‘the development path 
of China's peaceful rise’ (zhongguo de 
heping jueqi fazhan daolu). Zheng (2005, pp. 
18) stresses that China requires tactical 
measures to sustain a peaceful 
international environment, including the 
cultural support for the country and 
coordination of interests in its various 
sectors to create a better ‘climate’ for its 
development. Beijing soon adopted this 
concept through Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao’s speech during a visit to the US in 
2003, where for the first time China 
officially stated the determination of its 
rising power as a ‘peaceful’ country. 
Subsequently, after some minor alteration, 
Beijing finally used the term of ‘peaceful 
development’ as its official policy (The State 
Council Information Office, 2006). 
Indeed, in supporting the 
sustainability of its rapid growth, tapping 
into soft power has become one of China’s 
foreign policy agenda. The concern in 
creating a better international 
environment for China eventually 
manifested through the projection of soft 
power, especially in the form of 
campaigning China’s commitment for 
creating ‘peaceful development’ and 
‘harmonious society’ (Guo & Jean-Marc, 
2008). In all, there is a strong element of 
the efforts in building ‘benign’ reputation 
and transforming other countries’ 
perception to benefit China’s interests as 
its core policy framework. This is also 
reaffirmed by Hu Jintao’s (2007) statement 
which emphasizes the necessity to 
develop Chinese cultural soft power in 
dealing with domestic needs and the 
increasing global challenges. 
In the context of China-Southeast 
Asia relations, Beijing’s commitment for 
building its soft power in the region is 
essential. Many countries in the region, 
particularly maritime Southeast Asian 
countries, have often been having a 
suspicion against China and maintaining 
close relations with the US and its allies 
(Cho and Park 2013; Kristof, 1998). 
Therefore, Southeast Asian reaction to 
China can be deemed to be as a litmus test 
for its soft power projection (Rozman, 
2010, pp. 201). Within this context, Beijing 
finally developed a set of slogans, such as 
‘friendly and good-neighbourly’ (mu lin 
you hao) and ‘benevolence towards and 
partnerships with neighbors’ (yi lin wei 
shan, yu lin wei ban), in elucidating China’s 
new approach to the region (Tang, 
Mingjiang, & Acharya, 2009, pp. 17). In 
responding to Asian Financial Crisis, for 
instance, Beijing took the risk not to 
devalue its reminbi and agreed to give 
additional financial support for some 
countries in Southeast Asia (Jones & 
Michael, 2007, pp. 169-172). In contrast to 
the US which supported the IMF’s 
unpopular austerity packages, Beijing’s 
foreign policy signaled a real 
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transformation in its engagement with 
Southeast Asia (Percival, 2007, pp. 8). 
Moreover, Beijing also manifested its soft 
power campaign with being the first non-
member of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) to sign the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with 
ASEAN in 2003 and the support for the 
East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 (Pan, 
2008, pp. 39-62; Storey, 2011a, pp. 64-87). 
This signals the logic of China’s soft 
power projection—i.e. its determination in 
promoting a ‘benign’ image and assuring 
the neighboring countries with amicable 
foreign policy implementation. 
Reacting to China’s soft power 
projection, Southeast Asia demonstrated a 
positive gesture towards China. Beijing’s 
soft power projection have proven 
significantly in boosting Southeast Asia’s 
good perception of China. The initial East 
Asia Summit (EAS) formation, for 
instance, is aligned with Beijing’s 
preference to limit regionalism in East 
Asia (Nanto, 2008; Sutter, 2008, pp. 261-
282). In fact, this condition is also verified 
by how Southeast Asian eyes view China 
has transformed from ‘the state most often 
feared into, for most but not all, a 
perceived partner’ (Percival, 2007, pp. 3). 
Besides that, a public opinion survey in six 
Southeast Asian countries by the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry has indicated the rapid 
increase of China’s influence in the region, 
even compared to that of Japan (Er, 
Narayanan, & Colin, 2010, pp. 44-66). 
At this juncture, China has 
demonstrated its ability to put project a 
distinct reputation as a benign rising 
power in Southeast Asia. Denoting with 
the Nye’s conceptualization of soft power 
which emphasizes the ability to influence 
other countries’ perception and behavior, 
this condition affirmed the existence of 
China’s source of soft power in shaping 
Southeast Asia’s preference in accordance 
with its intention. Nevertheless, Beijing’s 
soft power projection in this region is not 
progressing on a linear pattern. In fact, 
China’s soft power is, somehow, complex 
and non-static, especially after the 
growing tension in the South China Sea 
conflicts since 2009. 
Beijing’s Increasing Hard Power 
Measures in the South China Sea 
Although there was an 
improvement in Southeast Asian’s 
perceptions and attitudes towards China 
after the end of Cold War era, some 
existing problems in China-Southeast Asia 
relations still exist. There are at least two 
important issues in here. First, looking 
back to the long history political 
interactions in the region, including the 
memory of China’s hegemony over its 
periphery, there is a widely shared 
attitude among elites which stresses the 
notion of sovereignty and power politics 
to as the means to survive (Kang, 2003; 
Katzenstein & Rudra, 2004). Second, there 
are some uncertainties about the rise of 
China, especially the enigmatic decision-
making process in Beijing and the 
question of what role China will want to 
play in the international arena. Both of 
these issues eventually lead to the 
formation of the general pattern of many 
Southeast Asia countries’ suspicion 
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towards China rise (Kristof, 1998, pp. 37-
49; Cho & Park, 2013). 
Being perceived as both 
opportunity and latent threat, many 
countries in Southeast Asia generally 
pursue a tactical approach in gradually 
engaging with China and maintaining the 
balancing options in case of engagement 
measure fails (Acharya, 2003a, pp. 2). This 
generates the variety of each state’ 
reactions towards China, ranging from the 
bandwagoning trend to the inclination of 
acting to balance against China (Kang, 
2003, pp. 58; Acharya, 2003b, pp. 150-153). 
Accordingly, the issues of power politics, 
geopolitics, the economic gap and 
dependence as well as the potential of the 
apparent territorial conflicts in the South 
China Sea added up to the strategic 
calculations of each country. Thailand, for 
instance, seem to have a better perception 
of China than Vietnam or the Philippines, 
which perceive themselves as the 
‘frontline’ of China’s possible aggression. 
The conflict is rooted in the 
multiple overlapping territorial claims. 
Southeast Asian countries such as 
Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Brunei, had laid official claim to several 
territorial features in the South China Sea 
in the mid-1960s and 1970s (Emmers, 
2010, pp. 66-77; Ott, 2011, pp. 1). However, 
many of these claims overlapped with 
China’s claim, which declared the area 
limited by nine dashed lines covering the 
South China Sea as its territory in 1947. 
Indeed, it is important to note that China 
has been only demonstrated a limited 
physical claim in the initial era, comparing 
to the other claimants which have a closer 
distance to the disputed area. Beijing has 
only started its active claim along its 
growing military power, such as the 1974 
China-Vietnam battle of the Paracel 
Islands and 1988 China-Vietnam skirmish 
over Spartly Islands (Shirk, 2007, pp. 114). 
China believes that the other claimants 
have been taking advantage for a long 
time, especially in exerting its claim over 
and extracting resources from the South 
China Sea. This logic pushes Beijing to 
pursue a more active measures (Li, 2008). 
Despite some efforts in managing 
the conflicts, such as the agreement of the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea (DoC) in 2002, there 
have been growing hard power measures 
on the South China Sea (Banlaoi, 2010). 
Indeed, since 1999 China had been 
annually declared unilateral fishing ban in 
the South China Sea from June to July. 
However, since 2009, Beijing extended the 
fishing ban from May to August 
(Macikenaite, 2014). Moreover, in reacting 
to Malaysia-Vietnam joint submission of  
the clarification of their claim on the 
‘southern part of the South China Sea’ to 
the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) on May 2009, China 
declared its rebuttal to the claim 
(Rajagobal, 2016). Subsequently, Beijing 
made unprecedented move in enforcing 
its jurisdictional claims in the South China 
Sea, especially by actively dispatching its 
patrol vessels to the South China Sea to 
protect Chinese fishing vessels outside the 
period of its unilateral fishing ban (Thuy, 
26  Beyond Brinkmanship 
 
2011). This certainly marked a significant 
change in Beijing’s approach to the South 
China Sea conflicts. 
Map 1. Conflicting claims over South China Sea 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense’s Annual Report on China to Congress (2012) 
During 2011, there were, at least, 
three events which illustrate the growing 
use of China’s hard power measures in the 
South China Sea conflicts. First, China 
often unilaterally patrol the South China 
Sea and expel other countries’ traditional 
fishing boats. In fact, Chinese People 
Liberation Army-Navy is reported firing 
some warning shots at the Filipino trawler 
near the Jackson atoll on 25 February 2011 
and Vietnamese fishing boats on 1 June 
2011 (Jamandre, 2011). Second, China has 
deliberately used the vessel of the 
paramilitary maritime law enforcement 
agency, namely China Marine 
Surveillance (CMS), to actively block 
foreign vessels from conducting research 
and exploration in the disputed area 
regardless their Executive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) claim. Two CMS vessels dispelled 
Filipino-owned vessel MV Veritas 
Voyager near Reed Bank on 3 March 2011. 
On 26 May 26 2011, CMS vessels 
intentionally cut the seismic survey cables 
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of Petro Vietnam vessel Binh Minh 02 
within the area of Vietnam’s EEZ (Storey, 
2011b, pp. 2-3). Likewise, when Hanoi 
complained about China’s actions in 
flaring tensions in Vietnamese waters, the 
Chinese response was an explicit warning 
for Vietnam to stop any activities ‘where 
China has its claims’ (Gomez, 2011). Third, 
despite the visit of Chinese Defense 
Minister, General Liang, to Manila and the 
joint agreement between China and The 
Philippines to refrain any unilateral action 
on 23 May 2011, Beijing allegedly kept 
installing markers at Reed Bank, Amy 
Douglas Reef, and Boxall Reef which are 
well within the Philippines’ EEZ (Mogato, 
2011; Pazzibugan, 2011). 
Beijing’s growing hard power 
measures also occurred in 2012. The 
Philippine navy sent its warship to the 
area of Scarborough Shoal, 220 kilometers 
west of Zambales and also within the 
Philippine’s EEZ, after spotted eight 
Chinese fishing boats anchored inside the 
lagoon. Soon after that ‘two Chinese 
surveillance ships arrived and taken up a 
position at the mouth of the lagoon’, 
creating standoff and preventing the 
arrest of the Chinese fishermen’ (CNN, 
2012; Dupont & Baker, 2014). Moreover, 
China also began enforcing the fishing 
band in larger area of South China Sea in 
May 2012, including the disputed 
Scarborough Shoal (The Jakarta Post, 
2012). By July 2012, Beijing dispatched its 
fisheries law enforcement command on 
and erected a barrier to the entrance of the 
disputed shoal (Pazzibugan, 2011). The 
Chinese government even promulgated 
local law in December 2012 which 
authorized the law enforcer to board and 
seize control of foreign ships which enter 
the Chinese-claimed waters and order 
them to change course or stop sailing 
(Banchard & Mogato, 2012). 
The abovementioned Beijing’s 
measures in the South China Sea have 
eventually triggered negative reprisals in 
the region, especially with how some 
Southeast Asian countries rapidly 
upgraded their naval capability. These 
actions are basically a harbinger of 
regional instability, and more importantly, 
to the degree of Southeast Asian 
confidence of China’s menacing intention 
(Banlaoi, 2010). Likewise, Beijing’s 
diplomacy in Southeast Asia has suffered 
a series of setbacks since 2009. While the 
issue of China’s aggressiveness was 
hardly securitized in the previous forum 
of ASEAN dialogue, the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) in 2010 finally raised the 
issue in regional public debate. In fact, 
some Southeast Asian countries, 
especially Vietnam and the Philippines, 
pushed for the involvement of other great 
power, particularly the US, in the debate 
(ASEAN, 2010). 
Indeed, although the growing 
Southeast Asian concern over China’s 
hard power measures in the South China 
Sea is apparent, it does not mean that all 
countries in the region have the exact 
same degree of grievance. There are still 
diverse forms of reactions from Southeast 
Asian countries, especially with regards to 
each country’s economic dependency and 
security concern towards China (Khong, 
2004, pp. 192-197). While some Southeast 
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Asian countries, such as Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar, generally have a closer 
relations and cooperation with China, 
other countries, such as Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, tend to 
show a more cautious and circumspect 
manner, largely due to the concern in 
maintaining regional stability. However, 
the Philippines and Vietnam have become 
more assertive in resisting China's 
domination in the region. As such, both 
countries have been supporting for the 
internationalization of South China Sea 
issues beyond China-ASEAN framework, 
including advocating for US’s 
involvement as a counter balance 
measures (Chongkittavorn, 2011). 
Nevertheless, one shall clearly see 
the emerge of a new distinct pattern in the 
Southeast Asian reactions towards China’s 
growing hard power measures in the 
South China Sea conflicts. The 
disconnected message between Beijing’s 
good image projection and its actual 
actions in the South China Sea conflicts 
inevitably generated grievances, induced 
counter-measures, and ultimately, 
exacerbated China’s soft power. With the 
fact that the characteristics of suspicious 
and mistrust still prevail in the region, 
Southeast Asian countries have the 
opportunity to internalize the concern 
over Beijing’s hard power measures in the 
South China Sea among its regional. As a 
result, there is now a growing trend in 
openly discussing the South China Sea 
issues in the ASEAN-related forums, such 
as the ARF’s joint statement in 2010 and 
EAS’s joint statement in 2011. 
Revisiting China’s Soft Power 
The development of Beijing’s hard 
power measures in the South China Sea 
has eventually incited the growing ‘threat 
perceptions’ in the region. But how it 
actually affects China’s soft power? 
Acknowledging reputation can turn into 
an essential source for inducing other 
states to respect and follow a particular 
state’s articulation, certain aspects that 
affects a particular country’s reputation 
can also acts as an important reference for 
other states in acting and responding to its 
environment (Hall, 2010, pp. 207-211). In 
the case of China-Southeast Asia relations, 
the growing ‘threat perceptions’ that 
Southeast Asian countries have against 
China are deemed as the crucial element 
in eroding a state’s reputation as the 
source of its soft power. 
There are two sources for 
identifying the weakening of its soft 
power. Firstly, one can see the effects of 
China’ measures in South China Sea on its 
soft power via investigating the Southeast 
Asian elites’ perception. As Southeast 
Asian elites maintain a strong role in 
foreign policy’s decision-making and 
policy implementation process (Tilman, 
1984, pp. 2-3), their perspectives reflect the 
attitude toward other states and the 
efficacy of their respective soft power 
performance. Secondly, the identification 
of how China’s soft power is affected by 
its growing assertive measures in the 
South China Sea can also be identified by 
the second source, namely the degree of 
favorability in public opinion. As the 
government is expected to respond to its 
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people’s aspirations, the public mood may 
act as an essential stimulant for the state’ 
attitude and action towards other states; 
and in the same time, display the result of 
other states’ soft power projection. 
Indeed, it is difficult to claim that 
there is a coherent and persistent 
perception of China among Southeast 
Asian elites. However, political elites in 
both Vietnam and the Philippines started 
demonstrating a striking perception of 
China, especially in their public 
statements. In his response statement to 
the Beijing’s action in the Binh Minh 
incident in May 2011, PM Nguyen 
publicly noted that ‘we continue to affirm 
strongly and to manifest the strongest 
determination of all the [Vietnam’s 
Communist] Party, of all the people and of 
all the army in protecting Vietnamese 
sovereignty in maritime zones and islands 
of the country’, signaling a deep distrust 
of China (Agence France-Presse, 2012). 
Moreover, in the Shangri-La Dialogue 
Forum in 2011, Vietnamese General 
Phung Quang Thanh specifically cited that 
‘China has violated the DoC, raising 
concern in Vietnam and in the rest of the 
region’ (IISS, 2011). Likewise, Filipino 
Secretary of Defense Voltaire Gazmin also 
expressed his concern about Beijing’s 
growing threat in his reference to another 
incident in May 2011 involving China in 
the Filipino-claimed area. Gazmin 
specifically underlined the importance of 
the Philippines’ ‘robust alliance with the 
US’ for tackling the growing China’s 
threat in the South China Sea and 
ensuring the freedom of navigation in the 
region (IISS, 2011). 
Moreover, Southeast Asian 
countries have also eventually signaled a 
reaction to Beijing’s hard power measures 
in the South China Sea, indicating a 
growing shared perception of China in the 
region. While prior to 2010 ASEAN 
generally demonstrated its affinity to 
China, some Southeast Asian countries 
signaled a new political message within 
ASEAN-led regional mechanisms. All 
countries represented at the EAS in 2011, 
for instance, agreed to discuss the regional 
concern over the South China Sea conflicts 
and embrace the US as a new member of 
EAS. Given the symbolic gesture, namely 
the involvement of other great power 
outside China in the region and the 
suggestion that the current tension should 
be carefully managed on the basis of 
‘multilateral resolution of the conflicting 
territorial claims’ (Calmes, 2011), the EAS 
statement signaled how most ASEAN 
countries accepted the growing Beijing’s 
activities in the region as a real concern. 
Besides EAS, this particular concern was 
also affected ASEAN internal 
mechanisms. Despite not reaching a 
consensus, ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting in 2012 discussed the Philippines 
and Vietnam’s concern about how Beijing 
was imposing ‘its claim over the entire 
South China Sea and raising the risk of a 
conflict’ (Thul & Grudgings, 2012). This 
meeting created a new precedent where 
‘ASEAN way of consensus failed’ and 
some countries held a strong and extreme 
perception of China (Emmerson, 2012). 
The above responses, indeed, 
signify the problem of Beijing’s soft power 
projection. Denoting the Nye’s primary 
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definition of soft power as the ability of a 
state’s allure in shaping the behavior of 
other countries, the shifting of ASEAN’s 
perspective and attitude to the opposite of 
China’s strategic interests, have shown a 
major change in the strength of Beijing’s 
soft power in Southeast Asia. Some 
Southeast Asian countries’ elite 
perceptions, especially from Vietnam and 
the Philippines, have indicated that 
Beijing’s aggressive measures in the South 
China Sea were perceived as excessive or 
inappropriate actions. Aligning with Li 
(2009) argumentation, the inappropriate 
utilization of hard power, which is formed 
the ‘threat perception’, can result in the 
demise of its soft power. Instead of 
Beijing’s good image and reputation 
projections that primarily affect Southeast 
Asian countries’ policy, the other forms of 
action—i.e. its growing hard power 
measures in the South China Sea, —has 
increasingly led elites in other countries to 
doubt Beijing’s reputation and act in 
contrary to the interests of China itself. 
Beyond the Southeast Asian elites’ 
statements, one can also indicate the 
weakening of Beijing’s soft power through 
the declining popular favorability towards 
China, especially after the growing of its 
hard power measures in the South China 
Sea. This condition is reflected in the 
public opinion in showing how China is 
perceived. Pew Research Database (2017), 
for example, reveals a distinct trend of 
China’s favorability. Although the 
research data base is limited to some 
countries in Southeast Asia, this data 
shows the dynamics of Southeast Asian 
response towards China. From Table 1, 
one can see that while showing a good 
respond to China in 2002, Vietnam and 
the Philippines signaled a dramatic 
change in the growing of unfavorable 
perception of China. Both countries 
showed a relative higher number of 
unfavorable views of China in 2014, 
especially with 78 percent of the surveyed 
people in the Philippines and 58 percent 
of the surveyed people in the Philippines 
regarding China negatively. 
Table 1. Percentage of Southeast Asian 
countries’ unfavorable responds to China 
Country 2002 2013 2014 2015 
Vietnam 18 - 78 74 
The 
Philippines 
30 48 58 43 
Source: adapted from Database Pew 
Global Attitudes Project - Pew Research 
Centre 2017 
Likewise, the BBC World Service 
Poll (2011) provides a similar data on the 
rising doubt over China’s amicable 
intention in the region. The BBC World 
Service Poll data reveals that some 
countries in Southeast Asia, especially the 
Philippines, have shown a gradual 
declining positive perception towards 
China. Whereas 54 percent of the 
surveyed people in the Philippines 
showing positive view in 2006, the 
favorability towards China dropped 
rapidly in 2009, resulting in only 39 
percent of the surveyed people 
maintaining such positive view. This is 
certainly not a standalone phenomenon. 
Linking this trend with the record of how 
Beijing builds its soft power, we can see 
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this trend as the weakening of China’s 
capability in projecting benign image in 
Southeast Asia since its heyday in the first 
half of 2000s. Despite it had been actively 
wielding soft power projection as a 
‘peaceful’ country since its official 
campaign in 2003, Beijing’s foreign policy 
was not perceived as a genuine 
characterization of its ‘peaceful’ rise 
campaign. In Southeast Asia, this 
condition was well apparent with a 
growing external context outside Beijing’s 
active in efforts building its soft power. 
Table 2. Change in the views on China’s influence in Southeast Asian countries 











54 30 39 52 
Source: adapted from BBC World Service Poll 2011
During the latter half of 2000s, 
there is a growing discrepancy between 
China’s perceived intention and capability 
in terms of its economic and military, 
especially in the form of bigger anxiety 
over China’s military threat compare to 
the confidence of China’s economic 
collaboration tendency (BBC World 
Service Poll, 2011). Table 3, for instance, 
indicates the dissonance of Beijing’s image 
in Southeast Asia and, therefore, the 
paradox of its soft power strategy in the 
region. While China’s soft power 
projection was in line with the 
development of the positive belief on its 
economic rise, the increasing Beijing’s 
assertive measures in the South China Sea 
also added to a growing perception that 
China is a threat to regional security. BBC 
World Service Poll (2011) even shows that 
there is a sharp contrast in the Philippine’s 
public view on China’s military capability. 
Whereas 46 percent of the surveyed 
people showing unfavorable view of 
China’s military capability in 2005, the 
number of negative perceptions rose 
rapidly to 63 percent of the surveyed 
people in the Philippines in 2011 
(GlobeScan, 2011). 
This dissonance between the 
perception on Beijing’s economic and 
military rise eventually affected China’s 
reputational power as the source of its soft 
power. With the growing discrepancy 
between its good reputation projection 
and actual action in the South China Sea, 
the ability of China’s soft power in 
influencing other countries was 
weakened. Table 2 and Table 3 
demonstrate the decline of China’s 
positive image in the Philippines’ public 
opinion and the link to Beijing’s growing 
hard power measures in the region. This 
becomes even clearer if we link the 
decreasing public favorability of China 
and the increasingly tougher Southeast 
Asian elites’ statements on Beijing’s policy 
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in the region. The existence of Beijing’s hard power measures in the 
Table 3. The discrepancy in the opinion on China’s economic and military concern in 2011 
 
China Becoming More 
Powerful Economically 
China Becoming More 
Powerful Militarily 
 Positive Negative Positive Negative 
The 
Philippines 
61 32 29 63 
Source: adapted from BBC World Service Poll 2011 
South China Sea has influenced the 
narrative of China’s reputation and its soft 
power in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the 
overall data presented cannot be deemed 
to rule out that there are diverse Southeast 
Asian countries’ reactions and perceptions 
towards China (Goh, 2007, pp. 823-824). 
However, at the same time, one shall also 
note that the shifting of Southeast Asian 
elites and public opinions towards China 
reflects an essential and unprecedented 
gesture in the China-Southeast Asia 
relations. 
Ultimately, the findings in this case 
vividly exemplify the importance of 
perception of China’s behavior. As one of 
the most influential major countries in 
Asia, China still has real impediments in 
wining ‘hearts and minds’ of its 
neighboring region. Notwithstanding its 
complexity, this also underlines the 
importance of reconsidering the notion of 
‘soft power’ and how it cannot be 
separated from other aspects in the 
international arena. Learning from the 
context of Southeast Asia, it is important 
for China to consider a nimbler approach 
in Southeast Asia, such as reconsider its 
hard power measures in the South China 
Sea and developing the use of military 
approach for the soft power purpose. 
Hence, with a better coordinated strategy, 
China can project a clear message in 
easing the threat perception in Southeast 
Asia and building a more coherent 
reputation as a benign country in the 
world. 
Conclusion 
Realizing the complex relationship 
between its image projection and actual 
actions in Southeast Asia, China’s 
experience has marked an important 
illustration of the logic and nature of soft 
power. China has made a significant 
transformation to wield its soft power in 
an appealing way. More importantly, 
China has demonstrated its ability in 
reducing suspicion and building a benign 
‘responsible global stakeholder’ image in 
the post-Cold War era. However, along 
with Beijing’s increasingly active hard 
power measures in the South China Sea 
since 2009, there has been a growing 
concern over China’s intention in the 
region. This uniquely added a new 
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complexity in how Southeast Asian 
countries perceive and react to China. 
The existence of many, albeit not 
all, Southeast Asian countries’ actions 
against China, especially in ASEAN-
related forums and its bilateral relations, 
have become a major turning point in 
China-Southeast Asia relations. At this 
juncture, one can see the growing threat 
perception from the increasingly Beijing’s 
hard power measures in the South China 
Sea affect its soft power, particularly in the 
form of inciting ‘threat perceptions’ 
among Southeast Asian elites and public 
opinions. This, in turn, casted doubt on 
Beijing’s virtue and real intention in the 
region, eroding China’s ‘reputational 
power’ as the source of its soft power. The 
South China Sea conflicts, in fact, have 
vividly demonstrated the fragility of 
China’s soft power in the region. 
In summary, beyond the focus on 
the possibility for open conflict in the 
South China Sea, it is important to see 
other political implications in the region, 
especially on Beijing’s soft power efforts 
in Southeast Asia. As China’s soft power it 
is still muddling through the current 
problem of the South China Sea conflicts, 
the only certain thing is that the remaining 
threat perception from the repercussion of 
its hard power measures will affect 
further the source of its soft power. The 
prospect of China’s soft power in 
Southeast Asia will rely on how Beijing 
can ponder the broader aspects of 
wielding its soft power effectively, such as 
the consideration of minimalizing the 
perceived-excessive measures in South 
China Sea and the ability to project its 
reputational power through a better 
understanding of Southeast Asian 
regional contexts. 
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